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have exposed a weakness in their algorithm, which
indirectly has a significant impact on the credibility of its
use in wireless environments.

Abstract— Wireless LAN technology, despite the
numerous advantages it has over competing technologies, has
not seen widespread deployment. A primary reason for
markets not adopting this technology is its failure to provide
adequate security. Data that is sent over wireless links can be
compromised with utmost ease. In this project, we propose a
distributed agent based intrusion detection and response
system for wireless LANs that can detect unauthorized wireless
elements like access points, wireless clients that are in
promiscuous mode etc. The system reacts to intrusions by
either notifying the concerned personnel, in case of rogue
access points and promiscuous nodes, or by blocking
unauthorized users from accessing the network resources.

Taking advantage of all the above weaknesses, one could
easily break into a wireless network with a minimal setup, a
laptop and a wireless card (which allows RF monitoring). To
make things worse, this kind of eavesdropping can be
carried in a completely passive undetectable mode.
B. Intrusion into WirelessLANs
Intrusion, in the field of networks, is defined as the act of
wrongfully accessing the network resources without having
appropriate privileges. Intrusion into wireless networks is
relatively easier when compared to wired networks.
Wireless networks are highly susceptible to intrusion
because of the radio technology that is being used. An
intrusion into wireless networks can be carried in two ways,
either by passively sniffing the wireless network or by
physically installing access points on the wired network in
unnoticed places.

Keywords— Wireless LANs, Intrusion Detection, Security,
Rogue Access Point, promiscuous nodes.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Security has always been a concern in communication
networks as it is in many other areas. The important typical
security issues that one should consider are, threats to the
physical network, unauthorized access to network resources,
internal and external attacks. In the context of wired LANs,
the solutions to the above issues are well defined and are
fairly reliable. The same approaches, however, cannot be
directly adapted to wireless LANs.
A. Security in the Wireless Networks
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the security protocol
provided in the IEEE 802.11 [8] wireless standard to bring
the security in wireless networks comparable to the security
in wired networks. Its main objective is to protect the data
that is transmitted over wireless links from malicious
eavesdroppers. WEP tries to accomplish its goal by
encrypting the data that is being transmitted at the MAC
layer.

Passively sniffing the network is the easiest intrusion
that one can attempt with just a wireless card and a laptop.
The wireless card can be slipped into RFMODE
(promiscuous mode) and all the data in the air can be
sniffed. Intrusion of this kind is possible if and only if the
network has wireless access points installed on the wired
network. In the case where the network has inaccessible
access points, one can intrude into a corporate network by
gaining physical access to the wired network and installing a
rogue access point. In either case, the attacks can either be
internal – attack carried by people within the organization –
or external – attack carried by people outside the
organization. In the latter type of intrusion, it is as simple as
passively sniffing the network once the access point is
installed.

The main scheme that is being employed in WEP is
Shared key authentication. Shared key cryptography is used
to authenticate and also to communicate with a mobile node.
However, studies [1, 2, 4] have proved WEP to be a
complete failure. In [1] it has been shown that WEP can be
compromised by successfully modifying the data, injecting
fake data and decrypting the data. As a result it has been
proved that Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) are all not achieved with WEP. A recent study [4]
has shown how packets can be forged in a wireless
environment, despite the protection offered by WEP2 ( an
improved version of WEP which is not yet standardized).
Last but not the least, inventors of RC4 encryption algorithm

II. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In our work, we designed and implemented a fully
secured agent-based intrusion detection system that detects
the presence of unauthorized wireless elements, namely,
rogue access points, wireless promiscuous nodes and
unauthorized clients. Depending on the kind of wireless
element detected, the system would respond accordingly. In
the case of the wireless element being a rogue access point
or a wireless promiscuous node, the response would be
sending the relevant information such as the geographical
information, the time when the element was detected, etc. to
the concerned personnel. If the wireless element turns out to
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rogue access points and promiscuous nodes in their
respective cells. In the case of an access point being present,

be an unauthorized client, the response would be blocking
that client from getting onto the network, thus preventing
unauthorized access.
Our solution to protect the wireless network mainly
focuses on detecting intrusions as soon as possible and
preventing them up to a certain level. Another important
aspect of this project is its vendor independence. This
solution can be deployed in a fully heterogeneous
environment unlike other vendor specific solutions. Other
advantages it has over similar tools like Netstumbler [5],
Kismet [6] is its ability to gather information about the
whole wireless network and communicate back with the
central location. One tool that is similar but not the same, is
Airtraf [7]. AirTraf is a database-aware software that mainly
detects rogue access points across the organization and
communicates back to a central server. Our solution is
different from AirTraf, by providing extra features like,
detecting promiscuous nodes, blocking unauthorized users
from accessing the network resources, and providing x.509
certificates to the users of the wireless networks. The x.509
certificates can be used by the wireless network users to
protect their wireless data by using a virtual private network
(VPN).

Figure 2 Overview of the architecture.

the agents act as both sniffers and firewalls, to stop
unauthorized users from accessing the network resources
and to detect unauthorized wireless elements. In the
following sections we explore the details of the system by
closely examining at the roles played by the agents and the
central administrator.

So our solution accomplishes all the threes A's
(Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) that WEP
was supposed to offer, in a completely heterogeneous
environment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In the section III we will discuss the design issues. In section
IV we will discuss the implementation and test bed details.
In section V we will discuss the advantages and
disadvantages (limitations) and possible future extensions
that can be made to the present system. In section VI we
conclude our work.

A. Central Administrator
The central administrator is the main central server that
acts as the centralized-entity to monitor all the wireless cells
in the network. It maintains the information of all the access
points and agents present on the network. It also maintains
the list of all clients which can use the wireless network.
Should a new access point or wireless client be installed on
the network, it has to be registered with the central
administrator; otherwise, it would be considered as an
unauthorized element. The central administrator maintains a
record for each access point which consists of information
about the geographical location it is serving, its MAC
address, the name and IP address of the agent present in that
cell, status of WEP etc. This information can help network
administrators in taking strategic decisions in strengthening
the security of the network. In addition to this information it
also maintains critical information about the client card like
its MAC address and the public key. The following are the
functions offered by the central administrator

III. DESIGN
One of the main characteristic features of radio is
attenuation of the signal with distance. Due to this inherent
property of wireless technology, we need to have multiple
access points located at various locations to have a
reasonable amount of wireless coverage. So given an area
where a wireless network has to be deployed, it can be
logically divided into cells as shown in Fig 1. Agents are
deployed in all the cells and are connected to the wireless
back bone as shown in Fig 2.

•

Registering and deregistering access points (AP), client
cards, and agents;

•

Scanning the network;

•

Generating x.509 certificates for client cards; and

•

Acting as a VPN server for the whole wireless network.

When a wireless element like an access point or a
wireless client card, is registered, the central administrator
will send the element’s information to all the agents. The
agents upon receiving this information act accordingly
which is discussed in section B. But, registering a client card
involves an extra action other than just sending the
information to the agents. When a client card is registrered,
an x.509 certificate is generated using the information like
the MAC address, user name, email address, department etc.
This certificate can be used by the wireless client to build a
secured tunnel (using IPSec [10]) between the central
administrator and the wireless node as shown in Fig 3.

Figure 1 An area divided into logical cells.

In order to provide wireless connectivity in a particular
cell, the access point should be connected to the agent (as
shown in Fig 2) that also acts as a firewall. The agents, in
the absence of access points, act as sniffers, looking for
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The other two important activities of the agents are,
scanning their respective cells for rogue APs and for
wireless promiscuous nodes. The agents scan for rogue APs
by sniffing for beacon frames emitted by the APs. Each time
a beacon is sniffed, the agent compares the source MAC
address of the frame with the list of registered access points.
If not found in the list of registered users, the agent
considers the AP to be a rogue one and sends a message
such as an email notification to the concerned personnel.
The agents also maintain the list of unregistered APs they
find in order to make sure that, they do not start a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack by continuously sending out messages
for each beacon found.

When an agent is registered, the central administrator
will add the agent’s information, name, IP address and
geographical location to its list of other agents’ records. This
information is used for communicating with the agents. The
central administrator can deregister an agent by removing
the agent’s record from its list of agents.

For detecting promiscuous wireless nodes, the agents use
ARP Spoofing [9] to fool the promiscuous nodes. The
Agents broadcast fake ARP messages, for all the IP
addresses in the subnet that the agent operates in, with fake
broadcast address (address that is not a true broadcast
address but will be considered as broadcast address [9]).
Should a promiscuous node be present in their respective
cells, it will respond back with an ARP response (refer to [9]
for details). Once the node is detected by its ARP response,
the information, like the geographical location, the IP
address, and time when the node was seen, will be passed on
to the administrator.

Figure 3 A VPN tunnel between the mobile node and the Central
Administrator.

B. Agents
Agents are the main building blocks on which the whole
system relies. It is the job of the agents to detect
unauthorized wireless elements like rogue access points and
promiscuous wireless nodes. These agents also act as the
first line of defense to protect the network from
unauthorized use of the network resources.
Each agent will be equipped with three network interface
cards one of which is a wireless interface. This interface is
necessary in order to sniff and detect rogue access points.
The other two are normal ethernet cards which are used to
connect the access point to the backbone (Fig 1). The
following are the functions of agents
•

Accept registration and deregistration messages for APs
and client cards from the central administrator;

•

Keep scanning the cell for rogue access points (Those
access points that are not registered with the central
administrator) and notify the concerned personnel if
found;

•

Detect promiscuous wireless nodes; and

•

Block unauthorized users (those who did not get their
card registered with the central administrator).

IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we discuss the implementation details of
how exactly the registration and deregistration of access
points, client cards and agents are done. We will also discuss
the test bed on which the system has been successfully
implemented and tested.
A. Registration and Deregistration
Figure 4(a) shows the GUI into which the user has to
enter the required information. A copy of the information
entered will be stored in a local flat file and another copy
will be passed on to all the agents as shown in Figure 4(b).

Each agent maintains a list of registered APs. When a
new AP is registered with the central administrator, the
central administrator will send the MAC address of the AP
to all the agents. The agents, upon receiving the registration,
will update their list of authorized APs by adding the new
MAC address to their list. Similarly when a deregistration
message is received from the central administrator, the
corresponding MAC address would be removed from the list
of trusted access points. In case of a client card, upon
receiving a registration or deregistration message from the
central administrator, the agents update their firewall policy
to allow or block the user depending on the MAC address of
the client card. Some might argue that vendors directly
incorporate MAC filtering into their APs. But the main
challenge lies in maintaining the list of such allowable MAC
addresses in all the APs present on the backbone. There is
no centralized solution that can update the list efficiently on
all the APs. Using our solution, we register the client card
once at the central administrator thus making it easy to
maintain the list.

Figure 4(a) Access Point registration GUI.

Once the agents receive this information they will store
the MAC address of the AP sent by the central administrator
in their lists of registered access points as shown in Figure
4(b). Likewise, when an access point is deregistered, the

494

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on June 17,2010 at 20:01:29 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

agents to update their firewall policies to block the user,
based on his/her MAC address, from using the network
resources

central administrator will instruct all the agents to the delete
the corresponding information from their lists.

Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the GUI and the process for
registering agents. Once the information corresponding to a
particular agent is submitted, it will be stored in a local flat
file and used when registering access points and client cards.

Figure 4(b) access point registration process

Figure 6(a) Agent registration GUI.

Similarly when an agent is deregistered, the
corresponding entry will be deleted from the list of agents.

Figure 5(a) Client card registration GUI.
Figure 6(b) Agent registration process.

B. Detection rogue access points and promiscuous nodes
The following two figures (Figures 7 and 8) show the
pseudo code for detecting the rogue access points and the
promiscuous nodes respectively.
Begin
sniff for 802.11b beacon frames
if beacon found then
extract MAC
if MAC exists in Registered access points list
Iterate again
else
if SSID exists in rogue access points list
next
else
send warning message
add SSID to rogue access points list
End If
End if
Else
Iterate again
End if
End

Figure 5(b) Client card registration process.

Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate how the client cards are
registered. The user has to enter the required information
such as user name, the user’s department, etc. into the form
shown in Figure 5(a). Once the information is submitted, an
x.509 certificate will be emailed to the user of the card. This
certificate can be used in implementing a secured tunnel
between the user’s mobile node and the central
administrator. A copy of the user information is stored in a
local flat file before sending it to the agent. The agents upon
receiving this information update their firewall policies, thus
allowing the user to use the network resources. For
deregistering a card, the central administrator instructs the

Figure 7 Procedure for rogue access point detection.
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The architecture employed in this project can be used to
solve some of the existing problems in IEEE 802.11
networks. One of the most important problems besides
security is interoperability between different vendor
products. For issues like the handoff mechanism, which does
not have any standard defined, different vendors have their
own proprietary solutions making it impossible to achieve
interoperability. With our proposed architecture, agents can
be allowed to transfer the clients between the cells instead of
the access points performing the handoff. With this
approach we can have access points from different vendors
cooperating with one other.

Begin
For each IP in the subnet
send a fake ARP and wait for reponse
if response seen
check log if entry exists;
if entry exits then
Iterate again
else
send a warning message and log the entry
Iterate again
End if
else
Iterate again
End if
End

Another interesting improvement that can be made to the
existing system is to allow restricted access to unregistered
users instead of simply blocking them. Traffic can be
analyzed at a corresponding agent each time an unregistered
user accesses the wireless network. The results of the
analysis can be communicated back to the central
administrator, which decides the legitimacy of the user
cumulatively using similar information from other agents.
Using such a solution, even unregistered users can enjoy the
convenience of wireless connectivity with, of course, limited
access.

Figure 8 Procedure for promiscuous node detection.

C. Test-bed
The system has been implemented on a test bed, which
consists of an Orinoco AP 1000 access point, a mobile node
(a laptop) and a desktop, as shown in Figure 9. Both the
agent and the central administrator are run on the single
Linux box. FreeSWAN 1.96 with x.509 patch has been used
as a VPN server to provide a secured connection to the
mobile clients. For additional details and results refer to
[11].

VI. CONCLUSION
Our agent-based intrusion detection and response system
has been developed to provide a secured wireless LAN
solution. Our main focus is on detecting unauthorized
elements as soon as possible. By incorporating the feature to
generate x.509 certificates, a VPN solution can be easily
deployed to overcome the shortcomings of WEP. The
architecture proposed here can serve as a building block for
finding efficient solutions for various other problems
discussed earlier. Since the whole project involves open
source tools, the cost for deploying such a system is very
minimal.
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Figure 9 Test-Bed.

V. DISCUSSION
The main goals of the project are, to make the wireless
network as secured as possible – using VPN, and to detect
intrusions as early as possible. The system has been fully
tested for its accuracy and promptness in identifying the
intrusions. One of the greatest advantages with our approach
is that, the wireless cell to be monitored has no geographical
restrictions. As long as the agent is connected to the Internet,
the wireless cell can be at any distance from the central
administrator. However, there are a few complications and
restrictions involved. Every wireless element should be
registered with the central administrator in order to be
labeled as legitimate. Another limitation on the functionality
of agents is its inability to detect a promiscuous node, which
is not IP based. Since we use the technique of ARP
spoofing, the agent can detect a promiscuous node if and
only if that node is associated with a TCP/IP stack. Lastly,
the system is meant for IEEE 802.11b networks. Should
there be an access point, which does not comply with the
IEEE standard, the system will fail in detecting it.

496

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Downloaded on June 17,2010 at 20:01:29 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

